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Prelude to the Establishment of the Nigerian 
Railway Corporation, 1949-1955
Tokunbo A. Ayoola
Elizade University, Ilara-Mokin, Nigeria
Abstract: Making use of previously unused Colonial Office records at 
the National Archives in Kew, including newspaper reports, interviews 
with staff of the Nigerian Railway, and debates in the Federal House 
of Representatives, this study examines the forces that dictated the 
establishment of the Nigerian Railway Corporation. It argues that the 
primary reason why the British colonial government established the 
corporation was to assist foreign interests in Nigeria by distancing itself 
from the direct management of labor relations between the Nigerian 
colonial state and the militant trade unions in the Nigerian Railway and 
other commercially oriented government departments. By placing the 
day-to-day management of these departments beyond the immediate 
reach of ambitious Nigerian nationalists who were anxious to quickly 
take over the control of the colonial state, the colonial government 
undermined the ability of local elite to build their weak economic base.
Key words: Nigeria, Railway, Ports, Labor Unions, Public, Corporations, 
and Management.
Introduction
During and after the Second World War, Britain, holder of many colonies in Africa, 
was in a serious economic crisis.1 In the last quarter of 1945, it owed more than 
£18,000 million,2 and from 1947 to the early 1950s, it experienced a deteriorating 
financial crisis.3 In order to solve these problems, Britain introduced a tight regime 
of import restrictions and a strigent dollar conversion program at home and in 
its colonies. Consequently, Britain’s multi-dimensional socio-economic problems 
would later determine imperial and colonial economic policies from the late 1940s 
to the mid-1950s.4 Within this period, the consensus of opinion in Whitehall was 
1 Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extreme, 1914-1991 (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1994), 
169-170.
2 William. Roger Louis and R. Robinson, “The Imperialism of Decolonization,” Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 22, no. 3 (September 1994): 464-465; Alan Milward, War, Economy and 
Society1939-45 (Berkeley: University of California, 1977), 71.
3 Asher E. Hinds, “Sterling and Imperial Policy, 1945-1951,” The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History XV, no. 2 (Jan. 1987): 148-149. 
4 Michael Havinden and David Meredith, eds., Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical 
Colonies, 1850-1960 (London: Routledge, 1993), 228.
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that the resources of British colonies should be exploited to their maximum potential 
for the benefit of the empire. The tone of the new imperial economic policy was set 
by Sir Stafford Cripps, the Minister for Economic Affairs. Addressing the African 
Governors’ Conference in November 1947, he stated:
The whole future of sterling group and its ability to survive depends 
in my view, on a quick and extensive development of our African 
resources. It is the urgency of the present situation and the need for 
sterling group…to maintain their economic independence that makes 
it so essential that we should increase…the tempo of African economic 
development and force the pace so that within the next 2 - 5 years we 
can get a really marked increase of production in coal, minerals, timber, 
raw materials of all kinds and foodstuffs and anything else that will 
save dollars or we will sell in a dollar market.5
One particularly important commodity Britain desired was groundnuts 
(peanuts), which was an important source of oils and fats for post-war Britain.6 
However, by early 1946, the world supply of oil and fats had become dangerously 
low, especially for Britain. In response, British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, was 
forced to set up a ministerial committee on World Food Supply (WFS) under his 
chairmanship.7 
Furthermore, due to food and raw materials shortages, Britain was plunged 
into a currency-convertibility-to-dollar crisis in August 1947. Consequently, Cripps 
formulated the above-mentioned policy. And to implement it, the government 
established two corporations: the Overseas Food Corporation (OFC) and the 
Colonial Development Corporation (CDC).8 Whereas the CDC was “to promote 
schemes either to earn dollars through exports to the United States or to save 
dollars by producing raw materials for Britain,” the OFC was to coordinate food 
production and increase supplies to consumers in Britain.9
Meanwhile Britain had not only suffered as a result of the war, but its 
5 See National Archives, Kew, England (hereafter NA) CO852/989/3 Speech by the Right Honourable 
Sir Stafford Cripps, KC, MP, Minister for Economic Affairs to the African Governors’ Conference 
on 12 November 1947. 
6 For instance, its production in Nigeria increased from the pre-war figure of 200,000 tons to more 
than 322,000 tons in 1946. See NA Prem 8/733 “Economic development in the colonies:” note by Mr. 
Creech Jones for Mr. Atlee Appendix I, February 5. 1948.
7 NA Prem. 8/202 “WFS Lord President Mission to United States and Canada.” 
8 See the Overseas Resources Development Act of 1948.
9 NA CO 852/867/1: CEDC (47)7 “Note by the Chairman on the formation of a Colonial Development 
Corporation. 
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colonies had as well. Most of their socio-economic infrastructure was neglected 
during the conflict and was in need of restoration and modernization. Furthermore, 
there were shortages of essential capital goods. Yet, in order to provide the 
necessary raw materials for Britain, the infrastructure of the colonies required 
serious rehabilitation. In the particular case of Nigeria, there were still delays in 
the transportation of goods even when railway operations had been fully restored, 
especially the transportation of peanuts from Northern Nigeria to the southern 
ports. This development prompted the Colonial Office (CO) officials to wonder if 
Nigerian Railway’s (NR) problems were not far more fundamental than the lack of 
essential equipment. This dilemma in turn caused officials to begin toying with the 
idea of the complete reorganization of NR.
Literature Review
The construction, development, and the management of the Nigerian Railway 
(NR), which was started in 1895, constituted one of the cornerstones of British 
imperialism in Africa and in colonial Nigeria’s political economy. Starting from 
that time and well into the postcolonial period, the NR was the largest employer 
of labor in the colony; and by the mid-1970s it had more than 30,000 staff.10 
But for the construction and development of the NR system, it would have been 
virtually impossible to bring together the many and different ethnic groups that 
now constitute Nigeria. Thus, the story of the NR is also that of Nigeria; without 
one the other would not have been possible.11 
In view of these crucial roles of the NR in the development of Nigeria and 
the expansion of the British Empire, there is a considerable volume of historical 
literature on its pre-war and post-war periods. Completely missing from this 
literature, however, is the analysis of the background to the transformation of the 
NR into a public corporation. There is, therefore, a gap in the existing literature 
on the NR and Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC). This present study therefore 
seeks to fill this gap. First, it is appropriate to review the extant literature on the 
NR and NRC to contextualize the study. To date. the two most prolific historians of 
10 Nigerian Railway Corporation, Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st March 1965 (Ebute-
Metta: Nigerian Railway Corporation), 35.
11 Tekena N. Tamuno, “Genesis of the Nigerian Railway II,” Nigeria Magazine 84 (1965), 84; Francis. 
G. I. Omiunu, “The Role of Transport in Nation Building: the Case of Nigerian Railways,” Nigerian 
Magazine 137 (1981), 7.
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the NR and NRC are Olasiji Oshin12 and Wale Oyemakinde.13 Whereas Oshin has 
focused primarily on the political history of the railway institution, Oyemakinde 
has concentrated on its labor history. Other prominent historians of the organization 
include Tekena Tamuno,14 Olufemi Omosini,15 John M. Carland,16 Lisa Lindsay,17 
and Francis Jaekel.18 The first set of historical narratives on the NR was undertaken 
by the organization’s officials. The first historical analysis was published in 1951 
and was by J. Stocker, an official in the NR’s publicity department. It was an 
overview of the development, achievements, and failures of the organization in its 
first fifty years of existence.19 The next was also by the NR itself and was published 
in 1960, the year of Nigeria’s independence. It was also a general overview of the 
historical development of the NR and its major milestones.20 
The first broad and academic study of the NR, however, is the two-part article 
by Tekena Tamuno,21 who traced the “genesis” of the NR and identified the major 
epochs in its development from the late nineteenth century to the 1960s. Tamuno’s 
analysis, though academic, was in line with the official accounts of the NR; and 
12 See Victor. O. Oshin, “The Development of Railway Transport in Nigeria, 1880-1945,” (Ph.D. 
Thesis, Obafemi Awolowo University, 1987); “Nigerian Railway under Stress, 1912-1945: a study 
in Colonial Planning and Management,” Odu: a Journal of West African Studies (1990): 11-36; 
and “Road Transport and the Declining Fortunes of the Nigerian Railway, 1901-1950,” Journal of 
Transport History 12, no.1 (March, 1991): 11-36.
13 See J. O. Oyemakinde, “A History of Indigenous Labour on the Nigerian Railway, 1895-1945,” 
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Ibadan, 1970; “Michael Imoudu and the Emergence of Militant 
Trade Unionism in Nigeria, 1940-1942,” JHSN [Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria] 7(1974): 
541-561; “The Nigerian General Strike of 1945,” JHSN 7 (1975): 693-710; and “The Railway 
Workers and Modernization in Colonial Nigeria,” JHSN 10 (1979): 113-124.
14 Tekena N. Tamuno, “Genesis of the Nigerian Railway I,” Nigeria Magazine 83, December
1964, 279-292; “Genesis of the Nigerian Railway II,” Nigeria Magazine 84, March 1965, 31-43.
15 Olufemi Omosini, “Railway Projects and British Attitude towards the Development of West Africa, 
1872-1903,” Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria V, no. 4 (June, 1971): 491-507.
16 John. M. Carland, Colonial Office and Nigeria, 1898-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1985), especially 
13-14, 135-165, and 166-183.
17 Lisa Lindsay, “Putting the Family on Track: Gender and Domestic Life on the Colonial Nigerian 
Railway” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1996); “Domesticity and Difference: Male 
Breadwinners, Working Women, and Colonial Citizenship in the 1945 Nigerian General Strike,” 
American Historical Review 104, no. 3 (1999): 783-812; and “‘No Need...to Think of Home’? 
Masculinity and Domestic Life on the Nigerian Railway, c.1940-61,” Journal of African History 39 
(1998): 439-466. 
18 Francis. Jaekel, The History of the Nigerian Railway, 3 Volumes (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 
1997).
19 John Stocker, Nigerian Railway Jubilee, 1901-51 (Ebute-Metta: Nigerian Railway Printer, 1951).
20 The Nigerian Railway Corporation, A Brief History of the Nigerian Railway Corporation (Ebute-
Metta: Nigerian Railway Corporation, 1960).
21 Tamuno N. Tamuno, “Genesis of the Nigerian Railway II,” Nigeria Magazine 84 (1965), 84.
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even those by Omosini, Carland, and Jaekel.22 Nevertheless, Omosini disagrees 
with Tamuno’s analysis that had traced the origins of railway developments in 
Nigeria to the time between 1889 and 1890. To Omosini, the origins of railway 
developments in West Africa should start from the 1870s,23 when many interest 
groups in West Africa and Britain began to lobby the imperial government to grant 
them investment and loan guarantee, and approval to construct railway lines in the 
British West African colonies.24
Also writing on the political history of the NR, Carland, discusses the 
crucial role played by the officials of the Colonial Office in London, particularly 
that of the Secretary of State for Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, in formulating 
and implementing policies and programs for the NR; and factors – financial and 
bureaucratic – that facilitated or constrained the construction and development 
of the first railway lines in Nigeria.25 In later studies, Oshin and Jaekel extended 
the discourse on the political history of the NR much further. Whereas Oshin’s 
studies on the planning, development, and the management of the NR focus on 
the period 1880 to the early 1950s, Jaekel’s is a comprehensive survey of the first 
one hundred years of the institution; from 1899 to 1999. Jaekel’s three-volume 
book is a disjointed discussion by a former colonial railway employee reminiscing 
on the “good old days” of colonial and postcolonial railway development and 
management in Nigeria.26
In contrast to the studies on the political history of the NR are those on its 
social and labor history, including those by Oyemakinde, Freund, and Lindsay.27 
Oyemakinde focuses primarily on the many related aspects of the history of 
indigenous labor throughout the NR system, from 1895 to the late 1945. He 
argues that the recruitment and management of indigenous Nigerian laborers 
were very crucial to the development of the NR; and that due to their discipline, 
skills, experience, organizational ability, and location in the economy, they were 
able to mobilize themselves and other workers in other sectors of the economy, to 
challenge the colonial authorities on many labor issues. On the other hand, Freund 
analyses the related issue of labor migration from the railway construction projects 
22 See Carland, 13-14, 135-165, and 166-183; Lisa Lindsay, “Putting the Family on Track: Gender 
and Domestic Life on the Colonial Nigerian Railway” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1996); 
Omosini, 146 and 491
23 Omosini, 146 and 491.
24 Ibid.
25 Carland, 166-183.
26 Jaekel,
27 See Tamuno, “Genesis of the Nigerian Railway I” 279-292; Tamuno, “Genesis of the Nigerian 
Railway II,” 31-43; Omosini, 146 and 491; Elizabeth Wrangham, “An African Road Revolution: the 
Gold Coast in the Period of the Great War,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History. 32, 
no. 1 (January 2004): 1-5.
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in Northern Nigeria into the tin mines of the Plateau area of Jos.28 Lindsay 
has complemented the works of other labor historians by specifically 
studying “the varying and contested masculinity and domesticity…within 
workers’ communities [and] between family life and industrial relations” in 
the south-western part of Nigeria.29
As can be detected from the literature reviewed above, none of them 
has discussed the background to and the formation of the Nigerian Railway 
Corporation, a very critical development, which since 1955 has come to 
define the character, nature, and trajectory of post-war railway industry in 
Nigeria. This article argues that the main reasons for the conversion of the 
NR into a public statutory corporation was for the self-serving economic 
benefits of British imperialism and Western merchant capital in Nigeria, 
to enable British merchants have some control and influence over the 
management of the NR in the postcolonial period, and to ensure that the 
colonial government would be far removed from direct negotiations with 
the stubborn post-war railway workers.
The paper is divided into the following parts: development of the NR 
from the late nineteenth century to 1945; examination of the role of the NR 
in the management of Nigerian ports up to the early 1950s; identification 
and critical examination of the various interest groups ranged against the 
NR vis-à-vis its management of the ports and the factors responsible for the 
removal of them from the NR’s control; and the, discussion of the important 
role played by European merchant capital, railway workers, British colonial 
and imperial officials, and Nigerian politicians in the creation of the (NRC).
Development of Nigerian Railway
In 1898, the British and Nigerian colonial governments began construction of 
Nigeria’s rail transport network. This was part and parcel of European “railway 
imperialism” of late nineteenth century Africa.30 The first phase of Nigeria’s railway 
network, the Lagos Railway, started in 1898. The railway extended from Lagos 
(Iddo) on the south coast to Abeokuta and later Ibadan in 1901, a distance of about 
28 William. M. Freund, “Labour Migration to the Northern Nigeria Tin Mines, 1903-1945,” Journal 
of African History 22 (1981): 73-84.
29 Lindsay, “‘No need … to think of home?’, 439.
30 Daniel. R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire. Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth 
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); C. B. Davis and K. E. Wilburn Jnr, eds. Railway 
Imperialism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); and Colin Divall, “Railway Imperialisms, Railway 
Nationalisms” in M. Burri, K. T. Elsasser and D. Gugerli, eds. Die Internationalitat der Eisenbahn 
1850 - 1970, (Zurich: Chronos, 2003), 195-209.
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120 miles.31 From Ibadan, the line was extended to Jebba. In 1911, the Baro-Kano 
line in the northern part of the colony was completed and a year later joined with 
the Lagos Railway line at Minna. In 1915, the construction of Jebba Bridge across 
River Niger was completed, and necessitated the extension of southern railway 
to Kano in the north. In eastern Nigeria, the Port Harcourt line was constructed 
to Enugu in 1916 to assist in the transportation of coal from the Udi Hills, near 
Enugu, to other parts of the country. 
Due to the completion of the Markudi Bridge, the Eastern Line finally reached 
Kaduna in 1932, which facilitated the crossing of River Benue. Further railway 
constructions were undertaken in phases, and by 1945 the rapidly developing rail 
network had reached Kaura Namoda in northwest Nigeria, and to Nguru, near 
Bornu, in the northeast (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Map of Nigerian Railway network.
31 Tokunbo A. Ayoola, “Political Economy of Rail Transportation in Nigeria, 1945-1985” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Manchester, 2004), 47.
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From the late nineteenth century to 1955, the NR was owned and managed by 
the Nigerian colonial government and its day-to-day affairs were managed by the 
Nigerian Railway Department. Originally designed to carry up to 1.5 million tons 
of goods annually, on the eve of the Second World War, it was carrying a little more 
than 1.2 million tons, and by late 1945, it was carrying in excess of its installed 
capacity. For example in the 1944/45 financial year, it carried a total of about 1.7 
million tons of goods.32 Right from the first decade of the twentieth century to 
the early 1960s, when road transport overtook its rail counterpart in importance 
in Nigeria, railway was the backbone of the British colonial government-run 
economy, which was primarily based on import and export trade. In fact, rail routes 
were first constructed and well developed before modern road network in West 
Africa.33 
 Although the operation and management of the NR industry from 1901 
to 1960, when Nigeria gained its independence, cannot be described as a great 
commercial success, the Nigerian Railway Department nonetheless recorded 
modest operating surpluses for several years. The highest of these before 1960 was 
in the 1958/9 financial year, when revenue reached £15.75 million, and a working 
surplus of £2,030,606 was achieved.34 This good performance was followed a year 
later in 1960/1, by poor financial results; with a net operating deficit of £988,000.35 
However, in 1963/4 the Corporation achieved its best financial performance to 
date: revenue of about £16.30 million and a working surplus of about £2 million.36 
Thereafter the NRC’s fortune began to decline rapidly from which it never 
recovered.37
Change of Government in Britain and NR
Coupled with the poor state of railway fixed assets, NR’s problems included a lack 
of locomotives, coaches, rolling stock, spare parts, and skilled and experienced 
European supervisory staff. Other thorny issues included ill-equipped workshops 
and poor management of labor relations.38 All of these problems, which were not 
hidden from the Nigerian colonial government and its imperial counterpart in 
32 Report of Mission Appointed to Enquire into Production and Transport of Vegetable Oils and Oil 
Seeds Produced in West Africa Colonies, Colonial No 211 of 1947.
33 Wrangham, 1 - 5.
34 Nigerian Railway Corporation, Annual Report 1964/1965. The amounts were in British pounds 
sterling.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 I. Ifedi, “Development Strategies for Nigerian Railway” http://www.thisdayonline.com/
archive/2002/06/21/20020621 let01.html.
38 For detailed discussions of these issues, see Ayoola, “Political Economy of Rail Transportation,” 
64-101.
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London, proved insurmountable to the British Labour government in power from 
1945 to 1951.39
This was not the case with the Conservative Government elected in October 
1951. The regime was determined to proffer solutions to the “…poor planning and 
bad management”40 in the NR. Its resolve further solidified when it discovered 
that at the beginning of the 1952/3 harvest season, about 150,000 tons of peanuts 
could not be transported from Kano to the coast.41 Consequently, the Conservative 
Government began debating the idea of transforming NR into a commercially 
viable organization. 
To fully comprehend the nature of NR’s problems, Oliver Lyttleton, the new 
Secretary of State for Colonies, paid an official visit to Nigeria in May 1952. The 
degrading NR he discovered convinced him that drastic steps must be taken.42 
Back in London, he convinced CO officials that two fundamental changes were 
necessary.43 First, it was essential that NR’s organizational structure should be 
changed from a department of Nigerian civil service to a public corporation. 
Secondly, there was an urgent need to replace the seemingly incompetent and 
sluggish General Manager of NR, D. C. Woodward.44
However, the very idea of converting not only NR, but other commercially-
oriented government departments into public corporations did not originate 
from London. The idea was first suggested by the Fitzgerald Commission.45 
Following the massacre of 21 coal miners by the Nigerian colonial police at the 
Iva Valley coal mines of the Enugu Colliery, the commission was set up by the 
Colonial Office(CO) in conjunction with the Nigerian government and headed by 
Sir William J. Fitzgerald, a former Chief Justice of Palestine and the Attorney-
General of Northern Rhodesia. As part of its findings and recommendations, the 
commission blamed the management of the Colliery and the colonial state for the 
inefficient control of the labor disputes at Enugu. Foreseeing similar problems in 
other government departments, the Commission recommended that they also be 
converted into statutory public corporations.46
39 Ibid.
40 NA CO 554/355 Movement of Nigerian Groundnut Crop. Report for the Prime Minister by the 
Secretary of State, 14 July 1952.
41 Ibid.
42 David J. Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development Vol.2 Developing British Colonial 
Resources, 1945-1951 (London: Macmillan, 1982), 201.
43 Ibid.
44 NA CO 554/611 Secretary of State for Colonies to Lord Leathers (Secretary of State for the 
Coordination of Transport, Fuel and Power), 4 July 1952. 
45 NA CO 537/5796 Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disorders in the Eastern Provinces 
of Nigeria, November 1949, 47
46 Ibid.
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Management of Nigerian Port by NR before 1954
The need to convert NR into a corporation was further underscored by two 
developments in the late 1940s. In 1949, another commission of enquiry was set 
up to look into NR’s operational problems.47 Headed by H.F. Pallant, the Assistant 
Divisional Superintendent of the British Railways in York, this commission painted 
a picture of Nigerian rail transport maladministration in its 64-page “meaty” 
report. Furthermore, it recommended that fundamental changes be made to NR’s 
organizational structure and procedures.48
The second development was the formation of the Strong Commission, which 
was asked to look into the functions of the Marine Department and the management 
of harbors in Nigeria, sectors where NR was a major player. Also, the Commission 
was mandated to make recommendations that would assist in setting up “a more or 
less autonomous body for example on the ‘Port Trust’49 model, which is found in the 
Port of London or Liverpool.”50 Prior to the setting up of the Strong Commission, 
the management and control of the two major ports of Nigeria, Lagos, and Port 
Harcourt, both of which handled more than fifty percent of Nigerian import and 
export trade, was without proper coordination.51 For example, there were no less 
than five separate bodies in charge of the operational aspects of Lagos port in 1941. 
These included NR, Customs Department, Marine Department, Port Department, 
and Public Works Department.52 Each was not only involved in revenue collection, 
but port maintenance as well. In addition to these organizations, there were several 
foreign commercial and shipping interests operating at the ports. The implication 
of this development was that it bred petty jealous and stiff competition among the 
various organizations, as they sought to outdo one another.
Although there were many bodies operating at the Lagos Port, the most 
powerful was NR, which foreign commercial and shipping groups believed was 
manipulating its management of Nigerian ports for its own selfish interests at the 
expense of “genuine” port interests.53 Hence, foreign interests led by the United 
47 Report on the Operating Problems of the Nigerian Railway 1949 (Enugu: Government Printer 
1950).
48 Ibid, 31-36.
49 In practical term, this is a semi-autonomous port managed by a Board of Management, but whose 
overall control is under the central government.
50 NA CO 583/301/8 A.N. Strong assisted by A.W. Flere, Report on Ports of Nigeria (Lagos, 1949). 
A. N. Strong, the former chairman of the Colombo Port Commission and the Ragoon Port Trust, 
headed the commission.
51 Ayodeji Olukoju, “Background to the Establishment of the Nigerian Ports Authority: the Politics 
of Port Administration in Nigeria, c.1920-1954,” International Journal of Maritime History, IV, no. 
2 (December 1992): 170-171.
52 Ibid, 173.
53 Ibid, 162.
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African Company (UAC), began criticizing NR’s inefficiency at the ports. 54
  It was largely due to such criticisms and the apparent lack of direction at 
the two major ports that the government decided to set up the Strong Commission 
to examine the situation and offer solutions. The Commission found that the 
administration of the port was indeed inefficient, and criticized the NR for not 
making a sufficient number of railway wagons available to transport imported 
goods out of the ports into the hinterland.55
 Based on these problems, the Strong Commission recommended that there 
should be unified control of all port operations under a Board of Management, 
a Port Trust, whose executive functions should be carried out by the Nigerian 
Marine Department.56 Following the recommendations of the Strong Report, four 
alternative proposals on NR and ports administration emerged.57 They were:
1. there should be a single corporation to manage and control the NR, all the 
ports in the colony, and to carry out all the duties hitherto performed by the 
Marine Department;
2. there should be a single corporation, but made up of two statutory sub-
committees, each of which would run Port Harcourt and the Lagos Port;
3. there should be separate port authorities for Lagos and Port Harcourt, and 
British companies in Nigeria, should manage the smaller ports; and
4. there should be two separate corporations – one responsible for the ports 
and inland waterways, while the other would manage the NR. However, 
coordination between the two would be effected through cross membership of 
their boards of management.58
 The possibility of removing NR’s hegemony at the Ports was too hard for 
Woodward to accept.  He therefore sought to defend his organization’s indictment 
54 UAC was the largest European commercial conglomerate in West Africa at the time. A subsidiary of 
Lever Brothers Limited, it was established in 1929 after the amalgamation of many other European 
firms operating in West Africa.
55 NA CO583/301/8 Report on Ports of Nigeria, 2-3.
56 NA CO583/301/8 A.N. Strong assisted by A.W. Flere, Report on Ports of Nigeria (London: HMSO, 
1949) Section 27. Under the new arrangement, all ports in Nigeria, including the smaller ones like 
Forcados, Warri, Burutu, Koko, and Calabar, which the big British commercial businesses were using 
exclusively, were now to be unified under one single Board of Management.
57  NA CO 583/301/8 “Minutes of a meeting in the Development Secretary’s Office on the 23rd of 
August 1950 to discuss the form of port authority to be set up following the recommendations of the 
Strong Report” enclosed in Acting Governor of Nigeria to Secretary of State for Colonies, Savingram 
No 2528 of 11 October 1950.
58 Ibid.
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by the Strong Report.59 While not disagreeing with the recommendation that 
multiplicity of control at the ports should be removed, he was opposed to the 
establishment of a rival authority to NR to manage them. Thus, to prevent a 
drastic reduction in NR’s influence, he put forward new proposals.60 Since NR was 
desirous of controlling and managing Lagos Port and Port Harcourt, Woodward 
did not object to the recommendation that both ports should be joined together 
with other minor ports and managed by a single port authority, provided NR would 
control the new authority. This position contradicted its original submission to 
the Strong Commission, which was that an autonomous Port Trust should not be 
established.61
 On the other hand, expatriate European firms in Nigeria organized together 
as an interest and pressure group, the Association of West African Merchants 
(AWAM),62 and opposed NR’s proposal on the new port authority.63 Consequently, 
the colonial government was caught in a dilemma, and initially seemed unsure 
how to implement Strong Report’s recommendations. Whatever course of action, 
both the Nigerian and British imperial governments were going to implement the 
report. They could not afford to ignore the interests and opinions of European 
merchant capital embodied in AWAM, which was certainly not a run-of-the-mill 
group of politically weak European firms in Africa. 
 During the post-war period, AWAM members were not only well entrenched 
in West African economy, they were well funded.64 In fact, some half a dozen 
AWAM members controlled not less than seventy-five percent of the sub-region’s 
59 NA CO 583/301/8 “Minutes of a Meeting held at Government House on the 1st September, 1950, to 
discuss the form of Port Authority to be set up following the recommendations of the Strong Report.” 
Enclosed in Memorandum on Report on Ports of Nigeria by Strong and Flere’ sent to the Colonial 
Office, 11 October 1950. 
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 AWAM was established during the First World War as a pressure group of British and French 
companies in West Africa. In its first incarnation, its main goal was to assist the European companies 
in coordinating policies and influencing colonial governments. This was for the purpose of gaining 
advantage over their African and Levantine competitors. Some of its members included United 
African Company (UAC), John Holt and Company (Liverpool) Ltd., Shell Company of West Africa, 
British Bata Shoe Company, Nigerian Hardwoods Ltd., Taylor Woodrow Ltd., Elder Dempester 
Lines, CFAO, and SCOA. See Anthony G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa (London: 
Longman Group Ltd), 259; David K. Fieldhouse, Merchant Capital and Economic Decolonization: 
The United Africa Company 1929-1987 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 127, 236; Josephine 
F. Milburn, British Business and Ghanaian Independence (London: C. Hurst, 1977), 5.
63 This was not a new objective of the European firms in 1950. From the late 1930s, they had wanted 
to achieve this, but the exigency of the war made such call a diversion.
64 Robert L.Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in 
Decolonizing Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 1945-63 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1998), 199.
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imports and exports valued at between £300 to 400 million in the 1940s. Of this 
considerable volume of trade, UAC, a predominant player in Nigeria, had the 
largest share. Not only this, by the late 1940s, it had invested about £4 million 
pounds in the Nigerian trading sector. For most of AWAM, the total equity capital 
of its members operating in Nigeria was more than £20 million during the climax 
of the war. 65
Economic muscle brought AWAM members many political privileges. For 
instance, they were represented on the executive and legislative councils in Nigeria 
and enjoyed tax exemptions that were not available to them in Europe and other 
colonies.66 In addition, UAC’s General Manager was not only a member of the 
Nigerian legislative council, but also had free access to the Governor of Nigeria.67 
Patronage of railway services by AWAM members in Nigeria was also very crucial 
to the economic well-being of NR in the 1940s and 1950s.68 The NR’s freight 
services enabled the companies to transport agricultural and mineral goods to 
the coast for export to Europe and imported manufactured goods into Nigeria’s 
hinterland. These transactions provided substantial profits for Western capital in 
Nigeria.69 
Aware of the economic muscle and the strategic position of AWAM members, 
a meeting was called on August 23, 1950 between Nigeria’s Acting Development 
Secretary, H. R. E. Browne, and AWAM delegation comprised of G. Cotgreave 
(John Holt & Company (Liverpool) Ltd.), N. Kay and L. Passage (United Africa 
Co., Ltd), G. H. Neville (Elder Dempster Lines Ltd.), and R. C. Irving (Lagos 
Chamber of Commerce) “in order to ascertain their views on the various alternatives 
which had been put forward” for the reorganization of NR and the ports.70 No 
single indigenous Nigerian political leader was, however, invited to take part in 
this meeting at which the final decision on the conversion of the NR into a statutory 
corporation was to be taken. At the end of the meeting, the consensus of opinion 
was that the NR and the ports should be reorganized into two separate statutory 
public corporations.71 
65 Ibid, 200.
66 Ibid.
67 Fieldhouse, 27.
68 Lauren van de Laan, “Modern Inland Transport and the European Trading Firms in Colonial West 
Africa,” Cahiers d’ etudes Africaines 21, no 4 (1981): 566.
69 Ibid.
70 NA CO 583/301/8 “Minutes of a meeting in the Development Secretary’s Office on the 23rd of 
August 1950 to discuss the form of port authority to be set up following the recommendations of 
the Strong Report.” Enclosed in Acting Governor of Nigeria to Secretary of State for Colonies, 
Savingram No 2528 of 11 October 1950. 
71 Ibid.
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Creation of the Nigerian Ports Authority and the Nigerian Railway 
Corporation
Eventually, the four proposals on the management of Nigerian ports and NR 
were discussed in the Council of Ministers and it was decided that two separate 
corporations should be established: one for managing all the ports, including 
the minor ports, and the second for NR. Although the decision to set up the two 
corporations was taken in 1950, the formal establishment of the Nigerian Ports 
Authority did not happen until 1954.72 The restructure of the Nigerian Railway 
Corporation was completed in 1955.73 On April 9, 1953, Ralf Emerson, an 
experienced British engineer, was appointed the General Manager/Chairman 
Board of Directors Designate of the proposed Nigerian Railway Corporation.
On 18 June 1953, Emerson left the United Kingdom for Nigeria to assume 
his new position. Pending the formation of the corporation, his primary duty was 
to serve as the technical adviser to the Nigerian Government on the establishment 
of the railway corporation in addition to serving as the General Manager of the 
existing NR. In this capacity, Emerson developed the policy proposals which 
formed the basis of the Nigerian Railway Corporation Parliamentary Bill that 
subsequently became the Nigerian Railway Corporation Ordinance.74 
In a twist of irony, Emerson had the unique fortune of writing his own job 
descriptions while already in office. He did not shy away from fortifying the 
position of the Executive Chairman with considerable powers. Shortly after the 
formation of NRC, he assumed the exalted position of Executive Chairman of 
Board of the Corporation, as well as its General Manager. In fact, the Nigerian 
parliamentarians who debated and passed the NRC bill into law characterized the 
chairmanship as a “railway dictator.”75 
On October 1, 1955, the ownership of the Nigerian Railway was formally 
transferred from the Nigerian Government to the new Nigerian Railway 
Corporation.76 Under the Railway Ordinance, NRC was given monopoly 
power and responsibility to carry out railway activities in Nigeria and 
manage and provide reasonable facilities for the carriage of passengers and 
goods.77 Furthermore, it was to control its expenditure in a practical manner where 
72 NA CO 554/468 “Nigeria: Creation of a Port Authority,” 1951-53. 
73 NA CO 583/301/9 “Note on the Present Situation of the Nigerian Railway” prepared by the West 
African Department, Colonial Office, 2 February 1951. 
74 Statement of the Policy Proposed by the Government for the Establishment of a Nigerian Railway 
Corporation (Lagos: Government Printer, 1954), 3.
75 Federal House of Representatives Debates, Session 1954/55 col. 864.
76 Ibid.
77 Nigerian Railway Corporation Headquarters’ Library Nigerian Railway Ordinance 1955 Section 
15C.
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annual revenues would be sufficient to meet all expenditures properly chargeable 
to revenue, and to direct the expansion of the railway system.78
Justifications for a Railway Corporation
Although it was widely accepted from 1945 onwards that NR was in urgent need 
of reorganization and modernization, Nigerian political leaders were not given 
the opportunity – as seen above by their non-participation in the meeting – to 
be part of this very important process. This disproves the argument by Nigerian 
colonial government officials that public corporations set up in Nigeria beginning 
from early 1950s were solely for the economic well-being of Nigerians.79 Rather, 
Britain’s economic interests and those of Western capital were more paramount 
in deciding the nature, character, and purpose of public corporations in Africa in 
the late colonial period. It was in view of this situation that Mofutou Laleye, a 
Policy Analyst, argued that public corporations in Africa were indeed children of 
political expediency and crisis of confidence between European colonialists and 
colonial peoples.80 This was unlike the rationale behind the nationalization of 
major industries in Britain, from where the public enterprise management model 
was copied. There, in the late 1940s to the 1950s, the Labour Government used its 
nationalization programs to reformulate new industrial policies.81 
Eventually, Nigerian political leaders, who initially were not consulted on 
the matter and were opposed to the recruitment of Europeans to head the new 
organization, were won over by colonial officials. However, Nigerian support 
was predicated on the hope that the transformation of NR would curb its manifest 
inefficiency. To buttress this point, in April 1952, while NR annual financial 
78 Ibid.
79 See the Chief Secretary’s address to the Legislative Council in March 1949, Legislative Council 
Debates, March 1949, 568. See also the speech of the Development Secretary when introducing 
the bill for the establishment of the first public corporation in Nigeria, the Electricity Corporation 
in Nigeria, Legislative Council Debates, March-April 1950 (Lagos: Government Printer, 1950), 
40. Some other writers also shared this view on the reasons for the setting up public corporations 
in Nigeria. For instance, A.H. Hanson, “Public Enterprise in Nigeria I Federal Utilities” Public 
Administration, 36 (Winter, 1958): 366-367; Ojetunji Aboyade, “Nigerian Public Enterprises as an 
Organizational Dilemma” in Administration for Development in Nigeria, ed. Paul Collins (Lagos: 
African Education, 1980), 83-98; and Sesan Ayodele, “Privatization of Public Utilities in Nigeria: 
an Economic Analysis of the Guided Privatization Policy,” Nigerian Institute of Economic Research 
NISER Monograph Series No. 3, 2000 (Ibadan, 2000), 1-35.
80 Moufoutau Laleye, “Public Enterprises as an Instrument of Crisis Management: its Particular 
Relevance to Underdeveloped Countries” in Public Administration in Periods of Uncertainty, ed. 
A.O Sanda (Lagos: Fact Finders International, 1992), 145-147.
81 Robert Millward, “State Enterprise in Britain in the 20th Century,” 8 unpublished paper; R. Kelf-
Cohen, Nationalisation in Britain The End of Dogma, Second Edition (London: Macmillan, 1961), 
14-24; N. Chester, The Nationalisation of British Industry, 1945-1951 (London: HMSO, 1975), 1-8; 
and A. H. Hanson, ed., Nationalisation: A Book of Readings (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), 12, 
22-63.
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estimates were being debated in the House of Representatives, the Minister of 
Transport, a Nigerian, Chief Bode Thomas of the Action Group Party, not only 
informed members with new thinking on NR - that is to turn it into a public 
corporation - but also that it would be alive to its responsibilities from that point 
forward. Many legislators heartily welcomed the new development.82
At another meeting of the House of Representatives on August 21, 1952, the 
Minister of Transport, Thomas, while reacting to the various comments of House 
members that centered primarily on NR’s inefficiency and shoddy services on one 
hand and the need to construct more railway lines to members’ constituencies on 
the other, stated that the Central government had decided in principle to establish 
an autonomous statutory corporation in place of the NR.83 Thomas went further to 
state that:
I can assure Honourable Members… that the proposal [to set up a 
railway corporation] is already being fully examined by Government 
and is receiving serious considerations.84 
Later he poignantly underscored the urgency and necessity of change in status for 
NR by arguing that: “If Nigeria does not determine the fate of the railway [NR]…
then the railway will determine the fate of Nigeria.”85 Thomas merely stated the 
obvious: NR was still a very important backbone of the Nigerian import and export 
economy at the time. The initial consensus achieved on the part of Nigerian leaders 
vis-à-vis the issue of a new railway corporation would later break down during 
the peak of the decolonization process from 1954 to 1960. This was followed 
by increasingly scathing criticisms against the colonial government and foreign 
commercial interests. The latter were referred to as “dictators and usurpers” and 
advised to remove their stranglehold on the Nigerian economy and institutions, 
82 This unqualified support cut across the three Nigerian regions and the three dominant political 
parties representing them in the Central Legislature. See Nigeria House of Representatives debates, 
First Sessions 14th-22nd August 1952, 336-340.
83 For instance, Jaja Wachukwu, a member of the House of Representatives from the Eastern Region 
complained that only old and dilapidated coaches were being sent to his region. While supporting 
this assertion, other Eastern Regional members, including prominent politicians like E. Eyo, equally 
complained that food served to passengers on the eastern line was inferior. See West Africa of 12 
April 1952. See also Nigeria House of Representatives Debates First Sessions 14th- 22nd August 
1952, 336.
84 Ibid.
85 West Africa, 4 October 1952, 913.
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including the NR, so they could be managed by Nigerians.86 
However, there were many factors in Nigeria that were responsible for the 
transformation of the NR into a public enterprise. First, by the late 1940s, the 
colonial government was itself overburdened by its excessive centralization and 
bureaucratization of government service, of which the NR was an important 
component. Reflecting on the prospect of establishing a railway corporation, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies stated “…it will also grant much needed relief 
to the Central Government machine in Nigeria from the great burden of work 
which is concentrated on it as present.87 Due to centralization and sluggishness of 
the civil service bureaucracy, it was often difficult to make quick decisions on the 
NR, especially in the area of capital development. Thus, it was necessary to have a 
new organization that could operate outside the ambiance of the main civil service. 
Linked to this is that from the start of the Second World War to the mid-1950s, 
despite carrying more freight than its installed capacity, NR was not recording 
adequate net surpluses as can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1: Nigerian Railway: Financial Results, 1939 – 1946 (£ Sterling)
Year
Gross 
Receipts
Total Working 
Expenditure
Operating 
Surplus
Interest on 
Capital
Renewals Surplus
1938-39
2,076,168 1,320,282 756,914 755,314 430,000 - 473,875
1939-40
2,024,741 1,221,967 806,572 766,275 430,000 - 326,471
1940-41
2,409,976 1,183,689 1,234,613 721,273 300,000 + 223,230
1941-42
3,145,915 1,368,796 1,775,853 919,396 300,000 +774,750
1942-43
3,583,118 1,627,394 1,960,183 945,520 430,000 + 869,412
1943-44
4,091,818 1,889,550 2,212,324 949,520 430,000 + 147,650
1944-45
3,961,405 2,042,422 1,919,670 949,547 430,000 + 661,716
1945-46 3,022,838 2,110,103 1,511,937 949,547 430,000 + 409,973
Sources: Nigeria Railway Annual Reports 1939-1946.
  
In fact, most of its operating surpluses were used in paying debts or put into the 
86 Remi A. Fani-Kayode, Member of the House of Representatives representing Ife Division, during 
the debates on the Second Reading of the Nigerian Railway Corporation Ordinance, 1955, 4 April 
1955. Federal House of Representatives Debates, Session 1954/55 columns 873; and Tignor, 236-
239.
87 NA CO583/301/8 Secretary of State for Colonies to Officer Administering the Government of 
Nigeria, Priority Saving No. 3815 of 24 November 1950.
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“Renewal Fund,” which was set up for renewing the NR’s fixed capital or assets. In 
view of this financial performance, there was a need to keep down operational costs, 
especially labor costs. As many strikes, negotiations, and concessions to workers 
were escalating, to understand the management’s perspective, it is here noted that 
by 1952, the NR’s workforce was more than 30,000.88 Hence, a corporation model 
of management would cut unnecessary bureaucracy and ensure that NR was run 
on a strict commercial basis.
Second, corporation-type organization relieved the colonial state of the 
burden of being the direct employers of railway workers while escaping from 
direct conflicts it was having with railway labor unions since the end of the war. 
Such was the nature and frequencies of these industrial conflicts that the operations 
and survival of the NR as a corporate organization was adversely affected. For 
instance in 1947 the Nigerian government was forced to concede in public that:
productive efficiency and power of movement of the Railway continues 
to be hampered by political and industrial unrest and much valuable time 
has had to be given to these matters by Administrative and Supervisory 
staff of employees when their attention was most desirable elsewhere; 
consequently the services of employees have been diverted from the 
efficient performance of their tasks to the detriment of production.89
The workers’ grievances included: lack of promotion, the domination of 
NR’s management by Europeans, racial discrimination, poor salaries and wages, 
non-implementation of agreements between railway unions and management, 
overwork, high-handedness by supervisors, and slow pace of the implementation 
of the “Nigerianisation” policy on staffing of NR.90
As a result of incessant railway workers’ strikes after 1945, the colonial 
government set up a commission of inquiry in 1949 to investigate and make 
recommendations on the labor situations in NR. Headed by a retired British judge, 
Justice Neville John Brookes, the commission found both the management and 
workers were intransigent in their relationship with one another. It noted that 
several of those interviewed spoke of “deterioration in industrial relations is not 
88 Annual Report on the Government Railway for the Financial Year 1952-1953 (Ebute Metta, Lagos: 
Railway Printer, 1953), 36.
89 Nigeria: Annual Report on the Government Railway for the Financial Year 1946-1947 (Ebute-
Metta: Railway Press, 1947), 8.
90 Ibid.
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recent [phenomenon] but has continued progressively over several years.”91 In 
view of such revelations, the Commission recommended a complete review of the 
existing machinery designed to resolve trade disputes and eliminate grievances.92
A few months after the commission submitted its report to the government, 
the workers again went on an organization-wide strike.93 Against this backdrop, 
the government decided that the best way to solve the perennial NR’s labor crises 
“once and for all” was to turn it into a corporation. This way, the new body would be 
able to hire and fire its staff more easily than the civil service rules and regulations 
had allowed. 
The Chief Secretary to the Nigerian Government underscored this point 
when he stated “…there were strong political reasons for establishing corporations 
to take over Government’s quasi-commercial activities. It was easier for such 
Corporations to handle labour disputes than it was for Government…” 94 The 
labor unions accurately read the mind and Machiavellian disposition of both the 
NR management and government. The workers openly opposed the proposed 
conversion for two reasons. First, the workers were very reluctant to transfer 
their services from the Nigerian Railway Department to a new, autonomous 
organization that, in a manner of speaking, was an uncharted territory.95 Secondly, 
they were apprehensive that the new corporation might not give them the same 
kind of privileges, stability of tenure, and perks they were enjoying in the current 
NR. 96 The workers’ open attacks to the government’s plan for the NR troubled 
the former. In fact, Thomas, the Transport Minister characterized the workers’ 
criticisms as being “unfair” and their behaviour as “exceedingly astounding.”97
However, realizing the need for the new corporation to have some stability and 
industrial peace in the transition period, the government entered into negotiations 
with the workers. The government went into talks with the two largest unions, 
the Nigerian Union of Railwaymen (NUR) and Railway and Port Workers Union 
(RPWU). The purpose of the arbitration was to assure the workers that they would 
not lose anything in the new corporation. After weeks of debate, it was agreed by 
91 See Report of the Commission appointed by His Excellency the Governor to investigate and make 
recommendations regarding the labour situation on the Nigerian Railway (Lagos: Government Press 
1949); and West Africa, 25 November 1952, 1080-1082.
92 Ibid.
93 Annual Report of on the Nigerian Government Railway, 1950/1951, Lagos: Government Press), 36.
94 NA CO 583/301/8 “Minutes of a Meeting held at Government House on the 1st September, 1950, 
to discuss the form of Port Authority to be set up … enclosed in ‘Memorandum on Report on Ports 
of Nigeria by Strong and Flere.’” 
95 See Daily Times, March 3, 1953 and March 19, 1953, 3.
96 Ibid.
97 Nigeria House of Representatives Debates Second Session 3rd to 31st March and 1st April 1953. 
See particularly the debates of 3rd to 18th March 1953, 18.
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both parties that the conditions of service of the workers in the new corporation 
would not be less than what they had enjoyed in the Railway Department. Having 
been assured of their status, the workers agreed that the new corporation should 
be formed.98
Another reason why statutory corporations were established in West Africa, 
according to CO and Nigerian Secretariat officials, was to ensure that “trusted” 
Nigerians could be carefully recruited into and entrusted with the joint management 
of sensitive organs of the colonial state.99 This had been the thinking of government 
in 1950 when the Chief Secretary to the Nigerian Government justified the need 
for establishing public corporations when he stated: 
 and it [will] also enabled [sic] Nigerians to share in the management. 
This was a consideration that would become even more important 
when the changes proposed under the New Constitution came into 
effect, because it would mean that Departments responsible for the 
Corporations would not be accountable to Ministers. 100 
In fact, a year earlier, in March 1949, while addressing the Legislative Council, the 
Chief Secretary articulated the need for public corporations by saying: “I myself 
feel that almost the greatest advantage to this country in this new conception of 
public corporation … is the advantage of Nigerian participation.”101
Finally, AWAM members specifically requested the Nigerian colonial 
government to develop social and economic infrastructure for the efficient 
exploitation of Nigerian resources. To achieve this, institutions, such as NR, 
should be reorganized into semi-autonomous corporate organizations. This call 
seems to have become imperative when Nigerians were demanding complete 
Nigerianisation of government and public service. Within this context, AWAM 
members concluded that their interests would not be well represented if Nigerians 
controlled the entire service. Thus, the establishment of corporations would 
provide the right opportunities for their representatives to sit as board members of 
98 British Library - Nigerian Railway, Report on the Government Railway for the Period 1st April- 
30th September 1955 (Lagos: Government Press), 24.
99 See NA CO 583/301/8 “Minutes of a Meeting held at Government House on the 1st of September, 
1950, to discuss the form of Port Authority to be set up.” 
100 Ibid.
101 British Library: Nigerian Legislative Council debates, March 1949, 568.
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the proposed statutory corporations.102 
Conclusion
This paper examined the crises that confronted British economy at the end of the 
Second World War and the decision by Whitehall that Britain’s economy would 
be rebuilt through the exploitation of the economic resources of its colonies. This 
policy defined post-war economic development of the metropolis and colonies. 
To give practical effects to it in the colonies, efforts were made to rebuild social 
and economic infrastructure damaged or neglected during the war. A case in point 
was the Nigerian Railway, which after the war started receiving rolling stocks, but 
was still inefficient in the transportation of goods and passengers. Thus, it became 
imperative that the NR should be reorganized for efficiency and effectiveness. 
After initial hesitations, all stakeholders involved with the NR-Nigerian 
political leaders, railway workers, colonial and imperial officials, and European 
merchants in West Africa - agreed that the organization should become a corporation. 
In the end, two crucial questions engaged the minds of the stakeholders: How 
would the NR be reorganized? Who would receive the benefit? In answering these 
questions, each of the actors was propelled by their own economic calculations. 
Although both the imperial and Nigerian colonial government officials openly 
declared that the transformation of the NR into a public corporation was mainly 
for the benefit of Nigerians, the truth is there were other self-serving reasons 
on the part of the colonial government and Western merchant capital. To begin 
with, the merchants wanted to exercise some direct control and influence over the 
management of these strategic organizations. Also, for the colonial government, 
the reorganization was not so much that the NRC would make profit, but as Cowen 
proves: “criteria for establishing colonial enterprise [were] neither of corporate 
profitability nor of colonial social welfare, but of vaguely defined propensities 
for dollar savings according to [the] British nation.”103 Thus, NR’s transformation 
was geared towards serving Britain’s overall economic interests. Furthermore, the 
government set up a corporation so that it would be able to distance itself from 
direct negotiation with “recalcitrant” railway workers and to simplify the hiring 
102 The foreign business community stated this point when it was making its position known on the 
Strong Report. Suggesting how the boards of the transport corporations should be constituted, the 
shipping firms stated: “[t]he persons most concerned with the operation of the port are ship-owners. 
We proposed that there should be 3 representatives of the ship owners, to be nominated by the West 
African Lines Conference. We further suggest that the Importers and Exporters and Traders should 
be represented by 4 members who should be nominated having regard to their business activities 
only.” See NA CO 583/301/8 Memorandum on the Strong’s Report on the Ports of Nigeria prepared 
by the Elder Dempester Lines Limited, John Holt Line Limited and Palm Limited, 22 February 1950. 
103 Mike Cowen, “Early Years of the Colonial Development Corporation: British State Enterprise 
Overseas During Late Colonialism” African Affairs (1984): 64
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and firing process for railway workers in the colony. Thus, overall performance 
of the Nigerian Railway Corporation between 1955 and 1960, when Nigeria first 
gained its independence, was not different from the pre-1955 period. Additionally, 
rather than labor crises getting reduced in the NR, they increased in number 
and complexity in the late colonial period, a situation that eventually forced the 
“Railway Dictator,” Sir Ralf Emerson, and other European officers out of the 
corporation in the first half of the 1960s.
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